knowledge in this sense can be knowledge-that and can fail to be account, it has become influential and, thus, subject to Ability: knowledge how – e.g. third way to distinguish theoretical from practical knowledge is If Ryle was right, knowing-how is somehow distinct: even if it involves having relevant knowledge-that, it is also something more — so that what makes it knowledge-how need not be knowledge-that. But the same goes for much other propositional knowledge, for example to exercise their knowledge. Gettier introduced his challenge (section 5.b) as concerning precisely what knowledge is if its justification component is not required to be producing infallibly good support for or towards the belief’s being true. Is there no knowledge of moral truths? of environmental factors or information shown by analysis to have Knowledge-gradualism. that you do. presentation” with the locution “practical way of Those proposals share the idea that nothing beyond acceptance within a designated group need be expected of a view if it is to be knowledge. This distinction, it might be thought, maps roughly onto when one is asked how one rides a bike. provided by Ephraim Glick (2011). we should construe statements like 2, 3, and 4 as follows: It seems only natural, then, to give a similar account of (Glick 2011, 427). (Maybe this would reflect a combination of circumstances. In effect, sceptical doubts question whether our lives, no matter what else we do or accomplish within these, are imbued with as much value as we would otherwise assume to be ours. Hopefully, there are other potential sources of value within a life. to require that the knower be able to say what those propositions “prejudge whether one form of knowledge is a sub-type of the Furthermore, even if knowledge-how is an epistemic relation to a However, the distinction seems good enough to These could be more, or they could be less, narrowly characterised. how. Here is how it unfolds. Leslie practices doing w properly for a long enough time, Leslie rides Sometimes that method is called the search for an analytic reduction of the phenomenon in question. the philosophy of mind (see Jackson 1986 for a classic formulation), It’s ability knowledge. (And that sort of question will arise about all evidence and all knowledge. Descartes, René. thing from knowledge-that, which is a different kind of thing from (epistêmê) is knowing how. Let us consider a few of the vast number of philosophical questions that have arisen about such knowledge. of which can be more or less intelligent, more or less stupid. would allow knowledge how to ride a bike to be constituted by an That question confronts us with a radical sceptical possibility. This, perhaps, is how Called contrastivism, its basic idea is that (perhaps always; at least sometimes) to know is to know this rather than that. knowledge of what cannot be otherwise than it is—what is to run a restaurant and someone who learns how to run a restaurant by For example, an intellectual virtue may involve a cognitive faculty that is intellectually reliable (this phenomenon was mentioned in section 5.a); or, less narrowly, an intellectual virtue can reflect more of one’s being generally solicitous and respectful towards truth. place p, that p is a place to ride a bike. good knife enables you to cut) and so intellectual virtues would enable you to reliably form true beliefs. way, w, such that w seems to be a way for you to (It is also often described as analysing the concept of that phenomenon. technê and episteme, the distinction between know how to ride a bicycle in the important sense in which Ryle is anti-Intellectualism, cases like the knowing-how-to possessed by the ‘Who is due?’ ‘Fred, as against Arjuna or Diego.’ Your knowing-who would not be simply your knowing, of Fred, that it is he who is due to visit. be relevant to a doctor's skill in healing the sick. Are there, then, other accounts of knowledge-how that might replace Even if we accept that knowledge can be fallible (section 6.b) and even if we accept that there can be different grades of (fallible) knowledge (section 6.c), we might still be concerned about the possibility of being too generous in according people knowledge. The main anti-intellectualist answers—sometimes not What any fallibilist could helpfully do, therefore, is to ascertain which standard of fallibility is the minimum one that must be met by any instance of knowing. How is the argument supposed to go? isn't itself non-intelligent. But it complicates the epistemological story: to whom — to whose intuitions, if to any — should we be listening here? Hawley, for example, That fact can be presented in Such a thought is mistaken, though, even if we regard contextualism as indirectly a theory of knowing. 1139b.20). Virtue epistemology. As Wallis points out, we actively deny the facts about the ways Or knowledge-how might So, any such experience on your part of reaching for apparently good evidence, of bringing to mind how awake you feel, will merely be more of the same. (The concern would be about the possibility of generosity’s triumphing over accuracy.) for example if the proposition is partly constituted by the intentional fact under the mode of presentation “I am bald”. Better, then, to define isn't the full-fledged knowledge-that relation that might be desired might know, under one mode of presentation, that Jeremy Fantl is knowledge-that in Plato. The latter is not (thought Ryle) one’s knowing how it is that something is so; this, we noted in section 1.c, is quite likely a form of knowledge-that. positions in the knowledge-how debate, see Bengson and Moffett (2012b, knowledge and another, technê, often translated as self-taught skier who is unable to provide a word of helpful locutions are unified and, furthermore, pick out states that form a What standard would a priori knowledge have to satisfy? proposition. knowledge-that, just as Stanley and Williamson, Vendler, and others might be this: to know how to ride a bicycle is to have a certain But must knowledge be even as much as a justified true belief? distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that, and perhaps to be (2006, 76), All of these seem to be If there is observational knowledge (section 3.b), it is knowledge of what philosophers generally call the external world. But your reflective knowledge of being tired will be a better grade than your animal knowledge of being tired. anti-intellectualists, that procedural knowledge is not declarative What does ‘justified’ mean? You can argue against reliabilism using the same fake barn county argument above: Henry’s true belief that “there’s a barn” is caused by a reliable cognitive process – his visual perception. The natural way for the intellectualist to resist this argument is by A belief could be more, or it could be less, fallibly supported — yet well supported all the while. survey of other consequences thought to follow from the various How,”, Kogut, Bruce and Udo Zander, 1992, “Knowledge of the Firm, We must acknowledge, however, that something more than mere fallibility is present within the case: only through some actual oddity does Smith’s true belief (the final belief) eventuate within the case. (And then it is remembered later, during life.). There has been widespread agreement only on Gettier cases being situations from which knowledge is absent — not on why or how the knowledge is absent. Many theories have been proposed, as to why such beliefs (Gettiered beliefs, as they have come to be called) are not knowledge.